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bstract
This paper examines the factors that account for the deterioration in the asset quality of Ghanaian banks during a period of financial crises using
 unique dataset on 25 banks from 2005 to 2010. Based on system Generalized Method of Moments estimations, we find that the persistence of
on-performing loans in addition to loan growth, bank market structure, bank size, inflation, real exchange rate and GDP growth are the significant
eterminants of banks asset quality in Ghana. The findings have implications for both bank management and regulators in emerging economies.
 2014 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. 
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.  Introduction
An efficient financial intermediation requires a stable banking
ystem to channel surplus funds into savings for investments to
romote rapid economic growth (King and Levine, 1993; Brown
t al., 2009). This is done through the creation of loan assets by
anks and other financial intermediaries. However, the creation
f the loan assets exposes banks to the risk of defaults by borrow-
rs as well as liquidity constraints. This does not only affect the
ank profitability but also the stability of the banking system.
umerous empirical studies1 have found high levels of non-
erforming loans to have preceded banking crises, as evidenced
rom the recent sub-prime mortgage crises. In many African
ountries, high levels of non-performing loans resulted in the
anking crises from 1982 to 1989. For instance in Ghana, Kapur
t al. (1991) and Daumont et al. (2004) documented evidence
hat about 41% of loans to private borrowers in Ghana were
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +27718491066/33243326567.
E-mail addresses: lateef85@yahoo.com, alhabd004@myuct.ac.za
A.L. Alhassan), ebocoleman@yahoo.com (A. Kyereboah-Coleman),
handoh@ug.edu.gh (C. Andoh).
1 Demirgüc¸-Kunt (1989) and Demirgüc¸-Kunt and Detragiache (1998).
eer review under responsibility of Africagrowth Institute.
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.on-performing and that seven (7) of the eleven (11) audited
anks were declared bankrupt. The major source of loan defaults,
s argued by Keeton (1979) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), are
rom information imbalances in credit markets. Due to infor-
ation asymmetry, banks are more likely to adversely select
igh risk loan clients because they can afford the high loan price
emanded by the banks. Additionally, the high loan rates may
lso induce ex-post behaviour by borrowers in investing in risky
rojects which increases probability of default.
Like in the other African countries which experienced bank-
ng crises in the 1980s, several reforms were undertaken to
mprove the stability of the financial system. However, finan-
ial stability risk within the Ghanaian banking industry is still
igh largely due to the continuous deterioration in the asset qual-
ty of the banking sector (IMF, 2011).2 This current empirical
nvestigation is motivated by this worrying trend and seeks to
rovide insights into the factors that contribute to the continuous
eterioration in bank asset quality in Ghana. While several stud-
es have examined the stability of banking systems in developed
conomies and developing Asian economies, empirical evidence
or emerging African economies appear to be scant. In an early
tudy on the fundamental drivers of loan losses, Keeton andorris (1987) found that adverse macroeconomic environment
eads to high increases in provisions for bad and doubtful debt.
eanwhile Keeton (1999) provided first evidence on the linkage
2 See IMF Financial Stability Update Report on Ghana. The report further
sserts that any slight deterioration in the quality of banking industry loans will
ead to a collapse of the banking industry.
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in addition to loan growth, market concentration, size, income
diversification, inflation, GDP growth and real exchange rates
as the significant determinants of banks asset quality in Ghana
5 Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay,
and Venezuela.
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etween credit growth and the resultant lower credit standards3
hich contributed to high loan defaults among US banks. Kalirai
nd Scheicher (2002) also concluded that the quality of bank
oan assets was mainly influenced by macroeconomic factors
uch as nominal interest rate, production index, stock returns
nd business confidence. Bofondi and Ropele (2011) examined
he effect of macroeconomic factors on banks’ loan quality over
 20-year period in Italy. While the authors find household non-
erforming loans to vary directly with unemployment rate and
ominal interest rate, growth in GDP and housing prices had
n inverse relationship with the performance of loans granted
o households over the study period. Using the vector autore-
ressive (VAR) methodology to perform a stress test of the
anking system in Ghana, Amediku (2006) employed quarterly
ata from 1995 to 2005 to conclude that a deterioration in bank
on-performing loans resulted from adverse output shock and
ise in inflation.
Using a sample of commercial and savings banks in Spain
rom 1985 to 1997, Salas and Saurina (2002) examined the deter-
inants of bank asset quality. The authors find credit expansion,
ank size, efficiency, economic growth, portfolio composition,
nterest spread, equity and market structure as the significant
eterminants of problem loans. By employing both dynamic and
tatic panel regression models, Pain (2003) identified both bank-
pecific and macroeconomic determinants of non-performing
oans for major UK banks. The panel regression estimates indi-
ated that GDP growth, real interest rates and lagged aggregate
ending growth, and loan portfolio composition explained loan
oss provisioning of the major United Kingdom banks studied.
ouzis et al. (2012) examined both macroeconomic and bank-
pecific determinants of loan quality in the Greek banking sector
o identify economic growth, unemployment rate, lending rates
nd public debt as the significant factors that explain variations
n bank non-performing loans. The authors find that the type of
ank loan significantly affects the performance of overall bank
oan portfolio. Specifically, while the quality of consumer loans
nd business loans is greatly affected by lending rate fluctua-
ions and real GDP growth respectively, mortgages were found
o be least affected by macroeconomic developments.
Motivated by the economic and banking crises between the
980s and mid-1990s in a large number of Sub-Saharan African
ountries, Fofack (2005) examined factors that caused the high
on-performing loans for both the CFA and non-CFA4 countries;
dentifying economic growth, depreciation in the exchange rate,
eal interest rate, net interest margins and interbank loans as the
ignificant contributing factors of the banking crises. In a study
nto banking consolidation after the banking crises in Nigeria,
zeoha (2011) provides evidence to suggest that consolidation
f banking system leads to a deterioration in bank asset quality.
hile the author finds liquidity and equity capital to have wors-
ned asset quality over the study period, profitability, unsecured
redit, and credit expansion improved the performance of bank
3 The relaxing of credit requirements.
4 Did not include Ghanaian banks although the study period covered the
anking crises in Ghana.
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oan portfolio. De Bock and Deymyanets (2012) assessed the
inkages between banks’ asset quality and macroeconomic fac-
ors in 25 emerging banking markets5 from 2006 to 2010. The
uthors identified fall in exchange rate and worsening terms of
rade as the correlates of bank asset quality. More recently, Klein
2013), in examining the causes of non-performing loans in Cen-
ral, Eastern and South Eastern Europe (CESEE) from 1998 to
011, found bank equity, profitability, excessive lending, unem-
loyment, inflation and exchange rate as the factors that cause
uctuations in the performance of bank loan portfolios.
From the empirical literature, bank-specific determinants of
sset quality appears to be scanty in many emerging markets
ith vast empirical studies on American, European and Asian
anking systems.6 The less stringent regulatory framework of
anking systems in emerging markets makes it inappropriate for
holesale application of the findings from developed banking
arkets in such markets. While a number of studies7 have exam-
ned various aspects of the Ghanaian banking industry, to the best
f our knowledge, no study8 has examined the bank level factors
hat explain the performance of bank loan portfolio. With Ghana
aving a bank dominated financial system9 like many African
nd emerging economies, examining the factors that account for
eterioration in bank asset quality would not only lead to banking
ystem stability but also improve the soundness of the financial
ystem in general. Also, the quality of banks assets not only
as greater implications for bank management and supervisory
uthorities, but also poses great challenges to governments in the
ursuit of stable economic environment to stimulate growth and
nhance the welfare of its citizenry. Against this background, this
tudy examines bank-specific determinants of asset quality in the
hanaian banking industry using bank level data on 25 banks
rom 2005 to 2010. Unlike prior studies, this study makes use
f a unique dataset to disaggregate non-performing loans into
ts different classes. This enables us to identify the source(s)
f persistence. From our results, we find that non-performing
oans account for 7.1% of banking industry assets, supporting
hat Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) describe as “a silent form of
istress” in which a significant portion of the banking system is
nsolvent, but still remains open. Our empirical estimation from
he system generalized method of moments (GMM) provides
vidence in support of the persistence of non-performing loansKeeton and Morris (1987), Keeton (1999), Gambera (2000) Rajan and Dhal
2003), Jimenez and Saurina (2006), Hoggarth et al. (2005) Bofondi and Ropele
2011) and Louzis et al. (2012).
7 Buchs and Mathiesen (2008), Bawumia et al. (2005), Amediku (2006),
boagye et al. (2008a), Aboagye et al. (2008b), Biekpe (2011), Saka et al.
2012), Aboagye (2012), Zangina and Bokpin (2012).
8 Amediku (2006) examined the effect of macroeconomic factors on non-
erforming loans.
9 In all, 75% of the assets of the financial sector are made up of bank assets.
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Fig. 2.1. Asset Structure of Banks (2010).
Source: International Monetary Fund (2011).
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ver the crises. Substandard and doubtful loans were found to
ersist on overall bank asset quality. The findings were robust to
oth ordinary least squares and difference method of moments
GMM) estimations.
The rest of the study is organized into the following: Section
 focuses on the overview of the Ghanaian Banking industry.
ection 3 gives the description of the data used and econometric
pecification. Section 4 discusses the results of the empirical
stimation and Section 5 concludes the study.
.  Overview  of  banking  in  Ghana
In the 1980s, most public sector banks were declared insol-
ent with about 41% non-performing loans attributable to the
rivate sector (Kapur et al., 1991, pp. 60–61). This period
lso witnessed numerous prudential banking reforms in Ghana
nd many developing economies; spearheaded by World Bank.
pecifically in Ghana, such reforms included the passing of the
anking Law, 1989 (P.N.D.C.L. 225), Bank of Ghana Act, 2002,
ct 612, the Banking Act, 2004a,b (Act 673), and the Banking
mendment Act 2007 (Act 783). The Banking Law (P.N.D.C.L
25) was revised in 1989 under the Financial Sector Adjust-
ent Programme (FINSAP I). Some of the new provisions in
he Act included placing limits on risks exposure; capital ade-
uacy ratio of 6%; setting uniform accounting standards and
xpansion of auditing scope and strengthening both on-site and
ff-site supervision of banks by the Bank of Ghana. The super-
isory powers of the Bank of Ghana were enhanced with the
evision of the Bank of Ghana Law (P.N.D.C.L 291) in 1992.
n 2002, the Bank of Ghana Act 612 led to the establishment of
he Banking Supervision Department responsible for the super-
ision and examination of all banking institutions in the country
o strengthen the regulatory capacity of the Bank of Ghana. The
upervision of the banking and credit system was to ensure
dherence to prudential banking reforms by Ghanaian banks.
he Banking Law, 1989 (P.N.D.C.L. 225), was replaced by
anking Act, 2004a,b (Act 673) to promote an effective bank-
ng system. The regulations in the Act covered the licensing of
anks, capital requirements, liquidity, ownership and control,
estrictions on lending, supervision and control and accounts
nd auditing. A notable reform in the Act was the increase in the
inimum capital adequacy ratio from 6% to 10%. The Bank-
ng Amendment Act (2007), Act 738, replaced the Banking Act
2004) with an additional function of ensuring the soundness and
tability of the financial system in Ghana and also the establish-
ent of offshore banking and other offshore financial services
uch as insurance and leasing with a focus of positioning Ghana
s the regional hub for financial activities in Africa and to attract
iaspora investments. As evidenced from the aforementioned
eforms, most of the regulations have sought to ensure adherence
o best banking practices.
.1.  Stylized  fact  about  Ghanaian  banks.1.1.  Asset  structure  of  Ghanaian  banks
The asset structure of Ghanaian banks is mainly made
p of loans and advances, assets held in foreign currencies,
i
i
b
2Fig. 2.2. Income Structure (2007–2010).
ource: Bank of Ghana (2011).
nvestments in government securities and other assets. From
ig. 2.1, banks loans and overdrafts accounted for 40.1% of
otal banking industry asset in 2010 compared to investments,
overnment bills and securities of 26%. In all 8% of the banking
ndustry assets are held in the form of foreign assets. The impli-
ations of the banking industry asset structure are that banks are
xposed more to credit risk.
.1.2. Loan  asset  portfolio  analysis
From Table 2.1, banking industry loans and advances
xpanded from 2005 to 2010. The gross loans granted by the
ndustry was GH¢m 2519.70 in 2005. This figure almost dou-
led to GH¢m 4146.5 in 2006. The rising trend continued to
010 at GH¢m 7994.70. The growth in banking sector lending
o private enterprises also followed a similar trend: from 68%
hare of gross loans in 2006, above the period average of 66.95%.
he period end figure of 72.8% shows the continuous reliance
f the private sector on the banking industry for funding. While
ousehold share in gross loans exhibited little variations between
he ranges of 13.7% in 2010 and 17.6% in 2008, credit to gov-
rnment and public institutions and public enterprises declined
rom 5.1% and 12%, respectively, in 2006 to 2.6% and 10.9%,
espectively, in 2010. The high concentration of lending among
rivate enterprises indicates that any adverse economic effects
ould affect the ability of firms to service bank debts and have
evere consequences for banking operations.
.1.3.  Composition  of  bank  income
Fig. 2.2 depicts the composition of bank income from 2007 to
010. Generally, the industry has high concentration of income
n the form of interest income. In 2004, the share of interest
ncome was 49.40% of total income compared to 21.50% for
oth commission and fee income and investment income. In
008, while the share of interest income increased to 55.30%,
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Table 2.1
Banking sector loans (2006–2010).
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
Gross loans (GH¢m) 2519.7 4146.5 5966.8 6920.8 7994.7 5493.73
Distribution of gross loans by economic sector (In %)
Private enterprises 68.0 64 63.4 67.6 72.8 67.0
Household loans 14.9 17.5 17.6 15.5 13.7 15.8
Government and public institutions 5.1 4.7 5.3 2.5 2.6 4.0
Public enterprises 12 13.8 13.7 14.5 10.9 13.0
Source: Bank of Ghana, 2011
Table 2.2
Profitability indicators (2006–2010).
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Interest Margin to Total Assets 7.8% 6.4% 6.6% 6.9% 8.4%
Interest Margin to Total Income 51.8% 46.1% 41.3% 39.4% 50.1%
Return on Equity 39.6% 35.8% 30.1% 23.6% 28.6%
Return on Assets 3.3% 2.6% 2.5% 2.1% 2.7%
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hat of commission and fee income and investment income
educed to 17.8% and 14.30%, respectively. Another observa-
ion from Fig. 2.2 is that Ghanaian banks continue to rely on
nterest income as evidenced by the non-interest income share
f total income being above 50% between 2008 and 2010. With
his income structure, increases in non-performing loans would
reatly affect bank profitability. Increasing income from non-
nterest generating activities would help mitigate their exposure
o non-performing loans.
.1.4.  Proﬁtability  Indicators
The banking sector’s net interest margin grew to 8.4% in 2010
rom 6.9% recorded in 2009. The industry’s share of net interest
ncome as share of total income grew from 39.4% in December
009 to 50.10% in December 2010. Marginal increases were
ecorded for return on assets to 2.7% in December 2010 from
.1% in 2009 while return on equity increased from 23.6% in
009 to 28.6% in December 2010 (Table 2.2).
.1.5. Capital  adequacy  ratio
Bank equity capital depicts banks’ ability to absorb losses
n their books. The capital adequacy ratio of the industry was
ontinuously above minimum regulatory requirement of 10%
rom 2007 to 2010. While a marginal decline of 13.80% was
xperienced in 2008 from 15.70% in 2007, the ratio increased
rom to 18.2% and 19.1% in 2009 and 2010 respectively. With
he current liberalized market and improving macroeconomic
nvironment, the prospects of the sector’s growth and develop-
ent are high. Because of competition, innovation and efficiency
n the industry are expected to deepen (BoG, 2011; Zangina
nd Bokpin, 2012). This might however, lead to more mergers
nd acquisitions since stronger asset base is needed to effec-
ively compete and still maintain appreciable profit margins as
ell as meet the new capital requirement of GH¢m 60 million.
hese policies together with the downward revision in the prime
d
c
cFig. 2.3. Capital ratio (2007–2010).
ource: Bank of Ghana (2011).
ate and a stable macroeconomic environment are expected to
osition the industry for greater growth (Fig. 2.3).
.  Data  description
This research considered 25 banks in Ghana covering the
eriod10 from 2005 to 2010 using annual bank data. The data
ere obtained from the Banking Supervision Department of the
ank of Ghana which serves as the regulatory body for Ghanaian
anks and the Ghana Statistical Services for data on macro-
conomic variables. The bank level data were extracted from
he year-end income and balance sheet statements of the banks.
ver the period, 26 banks had been registered to carry on bank-
ng business in Ghana. However, one bank was dropped because
f insufficient data points over the six-year period. Unbalanced
anel data were used for the analysis.
.1.  Variable  description
.1.1.  Asset  quality
Asset quality of bank loans refers to the timely manner with
hich borrowers are meeting their contractual obligations. In
his study, we employ the ratio of non-performing loans to gross
oans and advances as the indicator for asset quality. A higher
atio indicates lower bank asset quality. The asset quality (ASQ)
or bank i at time t  is given as;The study period was influenced by data availability. The data allows for the
ecomposition of the non-performing into sub-standard, doubtful and loss loans
ategories. This enables the testing for the persistence of the each of the three
lasses of non-performing loans on asset quality.
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here SSLi,t, DLi,t and LLi,t represent substandard loans,11
oubtful loans12 and loss loans13 respectively, whereas GLAi,t
epresents gross loans and advances for bank i  at time t.
.1.2. Banking  structure
One of the major goals of the financial liberalization poli-
ies is to improve the competitiveness of financial markets in
eveloping economies. This study therefore examines how the
hanging banking market structure has impacted on asset quality.
he relationship between bank market structure and stability is
xplained by the competition-stability and competition-fragility
ypotheses. According to the competition-stability hypothe-
is, competition-driven efficiency results in banks’ stability and
mproves the soundness of the banking industry (Pain, 2003;
oyd et al., 2006; Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005; Beck et al.,
006; Turk-Ariss, 2010; Schaeck and Cihak, 2010b). However,
he competition-fragility hypothesis posits that banks with mar-
et power (in a concentrated industry) earn higher profits to
mprove industry stability (Keeley, 1990; Bordo et al., 1995;
oggarth et al., 2005). In line with Keeton and Morris (1987)
nd Pain (2003), this study employed the Herfindahl–Hirschman
ndex (HHI) to measure lending concentration among banks in
he economy. The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index for loans and
dvances is given by;
HIL =
N∑
i=1
l2i
here HHIL and li represent the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index
or lending and the market share of loans for bank’s i  respec-
ively. The market share is the ratio of each banks gross loans
nd advances to total industry loans and advances for each year
tudied. A higher HHI indicates concentration in lending among
ew banks in the industry.
.1.3.  Loan  growth
The effect of loan growth on asset quality depends on whether
he growth is influenced by supply shift, which arises out of
anks’ willingness to lend or demand forces from borrowers
emand for credit. Keeton (1999) argues that when loan growth
s driven by banks’ willingness to lend, lending increases either
hrough the reduction in lending rates or lowering credit require-
ents for new loans. This would increase the likelihood that
orrowers may default on their loans, hence affecting the qual-
ty of bank loans.14 However, if the growth is from the demand
ide, the pull factors will drive loan rates upwards and lead to
ightening of credit conditions, ensuring greater scrutiny of loan
pplicants to reduce the possibility of adverse selection, and
ence lower the probability of future loan defaults – hence, a
ositive credit growth–asset quality relationship. The growth of
ank lending is given byLGi,t = LOANi,t−LOANi,t−1LOANi,t−1 where LGi,t,
11 25% of this class of non-performing loan is written off.
12 50% of this class of non-performing loan is written off.
13 100% is this class of non-performing loan is written off.
14 Salas and Saurina (2002), Jimenez and Saurina (2006) and Keeton (1999).
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OANi,t and LOANi,t-1 represent the growth of loans for bank i
t time t, loans and advances for bank i  at time t  and loans and
dvances for bank i at time at time t  −  1.
.1.4. Bank  size  (SIZE)
Bank size is proxied as the natural logarithm of total bank
ssets. While large banks are assumed to have better risk man-
gement techniques, which ensure proper screening of loan
pplicants and lower default rate, it is also argued that as banks
ecome too large, monitoring and evaluation become difficult as
hey take on increased risk. Empirical evidence on the relation-
hip between asset quality and bank size however remain mixed.
n line with Biekpe (2011) who suggests that the economies of
cale enjoyed by larger Ghanaian banks enable them to bene-
t from reduced risk, this study expects a negative relationship
etween bank size and non-performing loans.
.1.5. Interest  spread  (NITI)
Bank intermediation spread, measured as the ratio of net inter-
st income to total income, is used to capture the impact of
ost of bank lending on asset quality. A higher spread indicates
igher lending rates and intermediation cost by banks, ceteris
aribus Reduction in interest expense could also account for
igh spread. As found in other studies,15 an increase in the
pread increases the loan interest payments, which increase the
ikelihood of loan defaults. In addition, riskier borrowers would
e adversely selected since they could afford the high cost of
orrowing. Fofack (2005) found a negative but insignificant rela-
ionship between variable and non-performing loans in a study in
ub-Saharan CFA and non-CFA countries. The widening spread
n the banking industry provides strong support to test whether
igher lending rates lead to adverse selection and moral hazards
n the Ghanaian credit market.
.1.6. Income  diversiﬁcation  (INCDIV)
Diversification of a bank’s income source reduces the bank’s
ependence on interest income from loan repayments, hence
he reduction in the bank credit risk from lending. Banking reg-
lations by Bank of Ghana provide limit on the risk exposures
anks are allowed to undertake by placing a limit on their lending
ctivities which has focused attention on non-interest generating
ctivities. In this study, bank income diversification is proxied
s the ratio of non-interest income to total income (INCDIV).16
his measure reflects banks’ reliance on non-interest generating
ctivities besides the traditional lending businesses. Although a
egative relationship is expected, Stiroh (2004a) argues that any
iversification benefits would depend on the correlation between
on-interest income and net interest income. This we conclude
ould be the source of an income diversification having a positive
elationship with bank non-performing loans.
15 Salas and Saurina (2002) and Louzis et al. (2012).
16 Louzis et al. (2012) also employed the same measure of income diversifica-
ion.
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.1.7.  Macroeconomic  determinants
Macroeconomic conditions affect the ability of borrowers
o service bank debt. The cash flow of households and firms
s normally tied to economic cycles. Hence in times of adverse
acroeconomic shocks, indebted households and firms are more
ikely to default. Prior literature provides evidence of significant
elationship between asset quality and several macroeconomic
ariables such as GDP growth, real interest rates, inflation rate,
eal exchange rate, unemployment rate and money supply. In
his study, we employ GDP growth rate, inflation rate and real
xchange rate due to the inter-relationship among macroecono-
ic variables. For instance while economic growth is likely to
e reflected in low unemployment rate and higher per capita
DP, real interest rate and money supply will in turn influ-
nce the average price level (inflation rate) in the economy.
hile economic growth is expected to have a negative impact
n non-performing loans, inflation should have a positive rela-
ionship. The explanation provided for the negative relationship
etween GDP growth and non-performing loans as found in sev-
ral empirical studies17 is that growth in real GDP also results in
ncreases in disposable income, resulting in a high demand for
oods and services produced by firms. The increased sales would
n turn improve the debt servicing capacity of the firms and other
wners of productive resources. On the impact of inflation on
ank non-performing loans, studies by Fofack (2005), Baboucˇek
nd Jancˇar (2005), Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano (2006) have
ound that a rising level of inflation which characterizes uncer-
ain business conditions worsens the performance of bank loan
ortfolio, hence a positive (negative) relationship between infla-
ion and non-performing loans (asset quality). We consider the
ffect of portfolio flows on bank asset quality by examining
he impact of real exchange rate fluctuations during the crises
eriod on asset quality. Several authors18 have emphasized that
a weakening local currency makes it harder to serve foreign cur-
ency debt or exacerbate weaknesses in the banking system”. The
eason being the existence of vulnerabilities associated with an
vervalued currency in a highly dollarized or lightly regulated
nancial system. In this regard, it is argued by De Bock and
eymyanets (2012) that “debt denominated in foreign currency
s harder to serve when the exchange rate weakens vis-à-vis
he foreign currency and that, banks do not always completely
edge the exchange rate risk that arises from currency mis-
atches on their balance sheet”, consistent with Céspedes et al.
2004) and Burnside et al. (2001). It is further argued that, even
f they would, banks might be exposed to credit risk on loans to
rms that have borrowed in foreign currency and did not hedge.
hough these channels appear to be in contrast with older mod-
ls such as the Mundell-Fleming or sticky-price open economy
odels, where the financial sector is not modelled explicitly,
hey do overwhelmingly suggest that the use of the “exchange
ate” as a transmission mechanism is adequate in capturing the
17 Salas and Saurina (2002), Rajan and Dhal (2003) Fofack (2005) and Jimenez
nd Saurina (2006).
18 Dornbusch et al. (1995), Eichengreen and Hausman (1998), Calvo and
einhart (2002), Céspedes et al. (2004), Magud et al. (2011), Kamil (2012).
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ffect of “portfolio flows”. More so, since the effect of “capital
nflows” on “macroeconomic developments” was not the focus
f our paper, we deemed the use of the “exchange rate” in our
sset quality model as an appropriate instrument.
.2.  Empirical  model
From the empirical literature reviewed, dynamic panel model
ormulations were employed in examining the determinants of
ank asset quality. The models were adopted from Salas and
aurina (2002), Pain (2003) and Louzis et al. (2012).
SQi,t =  αi+β1ASQi,t−1+β2HHIt +  β3LGi,t +  β4SIZEi,t
+  β5NITIi,t +  β6INCDIVi,t +  β7GDPt +  β8INFt
+  β9RERt +  εi,t (1)
By taking advantage of our unique dataset which disaggre-
ates the banks’ non-performing loans into three classes,19 this
tudy attempts to identify the source of persistence. This is
one by employing the lagged values of the three classes of
on-performing loans in place of the aggregate lagged value of
on-performing loans to form Eqs. (2)–(4):
SQi,t =  αi +  β1SLRi,t−1 +  β2HHIt +  β3LGi,t +  β4SIZEi,t
+  β5NITIi,t +  β6INCDIVi,t +  β7GDPt +  β8INFt
+  β9RERt +  εi,t (2)
SQi,t =  αi+β1DLRi,t−1+β2HHIt +  β3LGi,t +  β4SIZEi,t
+  β5NITIi,t +  β6INCDIVi,t +  β7GDPt +  β8INFt
+  β9RERt +  εi,t (3)
SQi,t =  αi+β1LLRi,t−1+β2HHIt +  β3LGi,t +  β4SIZEi,t
+  β5NITIi,t +  β6INCDIVi,t +  β7GDPt +  β8INFt
+  β9RERt +  εi,t (4)
ASQi,t is the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans and
dvances for bank i  at time t; ASQi,t−1, SLRi,t−1, DLRi,t−1 and
LRi,t−1 are the lags of overall asset quality, substandard loan
atio, doubtful loan ratio and loss loan ration respectively for
ank i at time t  −  1. HHIt is a proxy for lending concentration
diversification) at time t in the industry, LGi,t represents growth
f loans and advances for bank i at time t, SIZEi,t is the size of
ank i at time t NITIi,t is the ratio of net interest income to total
ncome for bank i  at time t, INCDIVi,t is the ratio of non-interest
ncome to total income for bank i  in time t, GDPt is the annual
19 Substandard loans which are loans remaining outstanding for a period of
etween 3 and 6 months, doubtful loans for a period of between 60 days and
80 days and loss loans which remains outstanding after 1 year.
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Table 4.1
Composition of non-performing loans.
YEARS SLR DLR LLR ASQ L/NPL Stress ratio
2005 0.036 0.04 0.076 0.152 0.454 0.057
2006 0.016 0.027 0.062 0.105 0.602 0.070
2007 0.019 0.027 0.033 0.079 0.457 0.067
2008 0.022 0.019 0.038 0.078 0.44 0.048
2009 0.034 0.047 0.063 0.144 0.42 0.071
2010 0.032 0.026 0.081 0.138 0.486 0.114
Average 0.026 0.031 0.059 0.116 0.476 0.071
Source: Computations from Research Data, 2005–2010.
SLR, substandard loan ratio; DLR, doubtful loan ratio; LLR, loss loan ratio;
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DP growth rate i at time t, INFt is the annual inflation rate in
ime t and RERt is the annual real exchange rate in year t. εi,t is
he time variant error term for bank i  at time t, while αi is the
ime-invariant firm specific unobserved effect.
.2.1. Estimation  procedure
The dynamic panel data employed are modelled as below:
i,t =  β1yi,t−1 +  β2BSi,t +  β3MEFi,t +  εi,t
i,t =  αi +  μt +  ei,t
here yi,t is the non-performing loans ratio for bank i in year t.
his is explained by its lag yi,t−1, bank-specific factors (BSi,t)
nd macroeconomic factors (MEFi,t). The error term i,t is made
p of the unobserved bank-specific effect αi; μt, time-specific
xed effect and ei,t, the bank-specific time variant effect. The
tructure of the model gives rise to autocorrelations as well as
orrelation between the bank fixed effects and the error. This
roblem of endogeneity is corrected using the difference gen-
ralized method of moments (GMM) of Arellano and Bond
1991) which uses the first difference of the explanatory vari-
bles to deal with the fixed effects and their lagged values as
nstruments. However, in small sample data with small num-
er of time periods as employed in this study, the difference
MM has been found to have low predictive ability.20 This
tudy therefore employed system GMM21 of Arellano and Bover
1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) to deal with the con-
erns of the difference GMM. Following Roodman (2009), the
agged values of the bank specific variables were treated as
ndogenous, while the macroeconomic factors were dealt with
s being exogenous. Since this reduces the number of observa-
ions and the power of regression estimates, we employed the
rellano and Bover (1995) forward orthogonalization proce-
ure and collapsing method of Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) to limit
he number of instruments. To test the assumptions of instru-
ents’ validity and no first order autocorrelation, the Hansen
 test of over-identifying restrictions of Arellano and Bond
1991) was used to test the moment conditions of the estima-
ion procedure (Liu and Hsu, 2006). For robustness analysis,
he ordinary least squares panel corrected standard errors (OLS-
CSE) estimation of Beck and Katz (1995) was employed for
e-estimation of the model. The OLS-PCSE employs a sand-
ich type estimator of the covariance matrix which is robust to
he presence of non-spherical errors. The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
eisberg Lagrange Multiplier post-estimation was used to test
or heteroskedasticity, while the Wooldridge (2002) test of no
rst order autocorrelation was also employed. The results pro-
ided strong justification for the use of Beck and Katz (1995)
anel-corrected standard errors estimation method since evi-
ence was provided for non-sphericity of the error terms for
he static model.
20 See Blundell and Bond (1998) and Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) for
rguments against the difference GMM.
21 The system GMM estimations were carried out using the xtabond2 command
n STATA 12.
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a
rSQ, non-performing loans ratio; L/NPL, loss loans to non-performing loans;
tress Ratio, ratio of non-performing loans to total assets.
.  Results
.1.  Trend  analysis  of  asset  quality
The asset quality (non-performing loans) of banks, classified
nto substandard loans, doubtful loans and loss loans, was exam-
ned over the six (6) year period of the study. Table 4.1 below
etails the trend of the three (3) classifications of non-performing
oans (asset quality) in the banking industry.
Generally, the asset quality (non-performing loans/gross
oans) was above 10% except in 2007 and 2008. From Table 4.1
bove, 11.6% of loans and advances granted over the period were
on-performing compared to 18.5% in Nigeria after their bank-
ng consolidation (Ezeoha, 2011). On the classes of the bank
sset quality, loss loans ratio (ratio of loss loans to gross loans)
onsistently accounted for higher portions of the bank’s loans
ith an average of 0.059 out of the asset quality (non-performing
oans ratio) average of 0.116 and accounted for an average of
7.6% of non-performing loans. This indicates that 47.6% of
he industry’s non-performing loans were written off as losses
ver the period. Also, the 2005 recorded the highest write-off
f non-performing loans with a ratio of 0.602. It must be noted
hat though loss loans are about half of overall non-performing
oans, the combination of both substandard and doubtful loans
nsures the persistence of non-performing loans. This is because
oss loans are written-off and are replaced by substandard and
oubtful loans.
Daumont et al. (2004) (citing Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996)
efined systemic banking crisis whereby non-performing loans
re at least between 5 and 10% of total assets and thus likely
o be sufficient to wipe out most or all of the banking system’s
apital. On this basis, the stress ratio was computed as the ratio
f non-performing loans to total industry assets. On the stress
atios, the ratio of non-performing loans to total industry assets
as above 5% in all periods except 2008 which had a stress
atio of 0.048, with the highest ratio of 0.114 recorded in 2010.
he average for the study period of 0.071 indicates that 7.1% of
anking assets are made up of non-performing loans. This result
ndicates that the banking industry suffers from what Caprio and
lingebiel (1996) describe as “silent form of distress” in which
 significant portion of the banking system is insolvent, but still
emains open. This supports the report by IMF (2011) of a fragile
A.L. Alhassan et al. / Review of Develo
Table 4.2
Descriptive statistics.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max SWILK N
ASQ 0.116 0.119 0.000 0.704 6.951*** 133
SLR 0.027 0.032 0.000 0.145 7.143*** 135
DLR 0.032 0.041 0.000 0.289 7.711*** 134
LLR 0.060 0.080 0.000 0.544 7.994*** 137
HHI 0.083 0.011 0.060 0.090 5.189*** 141
LG 7.964 0.697 5.700 9.150 4.882*** 140
SIZE 19.290 1.192 16.200 21.448 3.249*** 141
NITI 0.608 0.137 0.292 0.873 1.261 141
INCDIV 0.389 0.116 0.123 0.708 −0.13 141
GDP 0.065 0.011 0.050 0.080 3.403*** 140
INF 0.135 0.031 0.090 0.180 −0.96 141
RER 0.118 0.198 -0.090 0.373 6.294*** 141
Source: Computations from Research Data, 2012.
ASQ, non-performing loans ratio; SLR, substandard loan ratio; DLR, doubtful
loan ratio; LLR, loss loan ratio; HHI, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index for lending;
LG, loan growth; SIZE, bank size, NITI, Net interest income/Total Income; INC-
DIV, Non-Interest Income/Total Income; GDP, gross domestic product growth;
INF, inflation; RER, real exchange rate.
*** Significance levels of 1%.
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cial centres as these banks (See Aboagye, 2012). This explains
the negative impact of competition of non-performing loans.anking industry where “even a moderate deterioration in asset
uality of banks would have led to insolvency of several banks”,
nd with total industry assets forming about 75% of the assets of
he financial services industry (IMF, 2011), foreclosure of banks
ill destabilize the financial system.
.2.  Descriptive  statistics
The descriptive results represented in Table 4.2 depicts an
verage asset quality of Ghanaian banks, measured as the ratio
f non-performing loans to total loans for the period from 2005
o 2010 of 11.6%. The average growth in bank size was 19.29.
he measure of concentration, the Hirschman–Herfindahl Index
HHI) of loan concentration which measures the concentration
f lending among banks for loan customers as 0.083, indicates
hat lending is diversified within the banking industry, hence
 competitive banking industry. The average credit growth of
.964% indicates a slower rate of credit extension within the
ndustry over the period. The mean for interest rate spread
f 0.608 indicates that 60.8%% of the industry’s total income
omes from intermediation activities, while the mean return on
on-intermediation activities was 38.9% of operating income.
he average GDP, inflation and real exchange rates for the
ix-year period are 6.5%, 13.5% and 11.8% respectively. The
harpiro–Wilk (SWILK) statistics indicates that all the variables
xcept interest spread, income diversification and inflation are
ot normally distributed at 1%.
Table 4.3 shows the correlation matrix for the variables in the
egression model defined in the previous section. According to
ennedy (2008), correlation coefficients of below 0.70 indicate
hat weaker relationships exist among the independent variables,
ence the avoidance of any potential multicollinearity problems
n the regression estimates.
T
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.3.  Determinants  of  bank  asset  quality
The Hansen J and Arellano-Bond test results for the validity
nd robustness of the systems Generalized Method of Moments
GMM) estimator respectively provide ample evidence of the
eliability of the estimated coefficients in all models. The Hansen
 statistics tests the null hypothesis that the over-indentifying
estrictions are valid. The test results for the models do not
eject the null hypothesis of valid instruments (because prob
χ2 are all greater than 0.05). A consistent GMM estimator,
ccording to Arellano and Bond (1991), must not exhibit second-
rder autocorrelation. Although all the models exhibit first order
utocorrelation, the null hypotheses of no second order auto-
orrelation could not be rejected. Due to the unbalanced panel
ature of the data, the total observations dropped to 84 for 22
anks from the 25 bank data analyzed.
The lag of asset quality was found to have a positive rela-
ionship with non-performing loans at a 1% significance level
o indicate the negative impact of worsening loan portfolio
f Ghanaian banks. Although loan write-offs in each class of
on-performing are expected to reduce current levels of non-
erforming loans, the poor loan portfolio ensures that more
erforming loans graduate to non-performing status with time
n proportions greater than the amount of loan write-offs. Their
oefficient of 0.337 indicates that 1% increase in the lag of non-
erforming loans ratio leads to deterioration in asset quality
f 33.7%. These results attest the persistence effect of non-
erforming loans. On the source of the persistence, the lags
f substandard (SLRt−1) and doubtful (DLRt−1) loans exhibit
ignificant positive relationship with non-performing loans,
hereas the negative relationship between loss loan (LLRt−1)
nd non-performing loans was insignificant. This makes current
evels of non-performing loans an important factor in control-
ing the future quality of bank’s assets. Pain (2003) and Dash
nd Kabra (2010) found evidence of positive persistence of non-
erforming loans. This result is, however, contrary to that of
ouzis et al. (2012) who found that increases in previous non-
erforming loss reduce current levels of non-performing loans
ue to huge write-offs among Greek banks.
The regression estimates also show that banking market con-
entration, proxied by the HHI for loans, negatively influences
he non-performing loans of banks at a 1% significance level
n models 1, 3 and 4 and 5% in model 2. This implies that an
sset quality improves in a concentrated bank market. A con-
entrated banking industry indicates that most of the industry’s
ending is concentrated among few banks, enabling them to have
ccess to more information on borrowers. This mitigates the
roblem of adverse selection and moral hazard leading to low
oan default rate. According to Petersen and Rajan (1995), banks
ith monopolistic power tend to be located closer to their clients
nd thus benefit from reduced monitoring cost and improved effi-
iency. As observed in Table 2.1, majority of loans are advanced
o private businesses which are normally located in commer-his finding supports the competition-fragility hypothesis. In
ine with expectations, loan growth (LG) exhibits positive and
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Table 4.3
Pearson correlation matrix.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1.HHI 1.000
2.LG −0.291*** 1.000
3.SIZE −0.365*** 0.487*** 1.000
4.NITI −0.039 0.008 0.004 1.000
5.INCDIV 0.121 0.124 0.130 −0.675*** 1
6.GDP −0.384*** 0.133 0.173** 0.059 0.034 1.000
7.INF 0.570*** −0.011 −0.046 −0.165* 0.245*** −0.118 1.000
8.RER −0.564*** 0.392*** 0.428*** −0.108 0.057 0.276*** 0.052 1.000
HHI, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index for lending; LG, loan growth; SIZE, bank size; NITI, net interest income/total income; INCDIV, non-interest income/total income;
GDP, gross domestic product growth; INF, inflation; RER, real exchange rate.
* Significance levels of 10%.
** Significance levels of 5%.
*** Significance levels of 1%.
Table 4.4
Systems GMM estimations.
Dependent variable: asset quality
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.417 (4.39)*** 0.546 (2.72)** 0.627 (4.12)*** 0.491 (3.14)***
ASQt−1 0.337 (3.29)***
SLRt−1 0.709 (3.66)***
DLRt−1 0.615(2.4)**
LLRt−1 −0.058 (0.41)
HHI −3.271 (−4.9)*** −4.814 (−6.22)** −4.494 (−4.72)*** −2.871 (−3.36)***
LG 0.003 (2.34)** 0.001 (1.74)* 0.003 (3.06)*** 0.002 (1.57)
SIZE −0.047 (−4.73)*** −0.072 (−7.93)*** −0.061 (−6.23)*** −0.051 (−3.31)***
NITI 0.111 (1.73)* 0.219 (5.98)*** 0.112 (1.82)* 0.106 (1.46)
INCDIV −0.043 (−1.21) −0.097 (−2.91)*** −0.016 (−0.38) −0.021 (−0.46)
GDP −1.006 (−2.68)** −1.206 (−6.33)*** −0.800 (−3.23)*** −0.665 (−2.24)**
INF 1.098 (5.92)*** 1.029 (5.37)*** 1.079 (6.75)*** 0.963 (7.38)***
RER 0.016 (1.73)* 0.014 (2.06)* 0.015 (1.47) 0.023 (2.65)**
AR(1): p-values 0.02** 0.059* 0.037** 0.050*
AR(2): p-values 0.822 0.84 0.264 0.490
Hansen J 12.36 12.38 12.18 16.64
Prob >χ2 0.778 0.776 0.789 0.479
Banks 22 22 22 22
Observations 84 84 84 84
Source: Results of Data Analysis in STATA 12.
ASQ, non-performing loans ratio; SLR, substandard loan ratio; DLR, doubtful loan ratio; LLR, loss loan ratio; HHI, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index for lending;
LG, loan growth; SIZE, bank size; NITI, net interest income/total income; INCDIV, non-interest income/total income; GDP, gross domestic product growth; INF,
inflation; RER, real exchange rate. AR(1) and AR(2) are first and second order correlation tests. Hansen J is the test for overidentifying restrictions. z-Statistics are
in parentheses.
* Significance levels of 10%.
*
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a** Significance levels of 5%.
** Significance levels of 1%.
ignificant relationship with the non-performing loans of banks
t level of 5% in model 1, 10% in model 2 and 1% in model 3.
his relationship is insignificant in model 4. This result implies
hat universal banks continuously extend relatively higher lev-
ls of credit experience deterioration in the quality of their
oan assets. This result is consistent with other international
vidence,22 which suggests an adverse effect of credit growth
n non-performing loans.
22 Keeton (1999), Salas and Saurina (2002) and Jimenez and Saurina (2006).
l
w
bBank size exhibited significant negative relationship with
on-performing loans to indicate that larger Ghanaian banks
ave lower non-performing loans. Consistent across all estima-
ions, the relationship is significant at 1%. This supports the
ssertion that large banks have the capacity to better manage their
oan portfolio associated with high risk. This result is consistent
ith the findings of studies23 that argue that larger banks have
etter risk management practices compared to smaller banks.
23 Rajan and Dhal (2003), Salas and Saurina (2002).
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Table 4.5
OLS and Difference GMM Estimations.
Dependent variable: asset quality
OLS-PCSE DIFFERENCE GMM
Coef. z Coef. z
Constant 0.719 2.56** 2.716 3.92***
ASQi,t−1 0.259 2.82***
HHI −2.883 −2.92*** −3.907 −3.55***
LG 0.004 2.14** 0.005 2.13**
SIZE −0.034 −3.14*** −0.091 −3.4***
NITI 0.126 1.52 0.018 0.15
INCDIV −0.013 −0.16 −0.175 −1.11
GDP −1.100 −2.18** −1.047 −1.74*
INF 0.884 2.98*** 0.892 2.83***
RER 0.024 1.12 −0.058 −2.55**
R-squared 0.2952
Wald χ2 (8) 23.17***
BP-CW Hettest: p-value 0.000***
WD AR (1) test: p-value 0.3253
AR(1): p-value 0.036**
AR(2): p-value 0.7611
Sargan: p-value 0.462
Banks 24 22
Observations 109 82
Source: Results of Data Analysis in STATA 12.
ASQ, non-performing loans ratio; SL, substandard loan ratio; DL, doubtful loan ratio; LL, loss loan ratio; HHI, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index for lending; LG, loan
growth; SIZE, bank size; NITI, net interest income/total income; INCDIV, non-interest income/total income; GDP, gross domestic growth; INF, inflation; RER, real
exchange rate. BP-CW Hettest is the test for heteroskedasticity. WD AR (1) is the Wooldridge test of autocorrelation. AR(1) and AR(2) are the first and second order
correlation tests. Hansen J is the test for overidentifying restrictions.
* Significance levels of 10%.
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amounts of goods and services they consume. This impacts
on loan customers who cannot easily turnover their goods** Significance levels of 5%.
** Significance levels of 1%.
e assert this relationship to result from economies of scale
njoyed by larger Ghanaian banks which enable them to benefit
rom reduced risk (Biekpe, 2011). Cost of bank lending cap-
ured by the net interest spread exhibited significant positive
elationship with non-performing loans at significance levels
f 10% in models 1 and 3 and 1% in model 2. The intuitive
xplanation for this relationship lies in the high intermediation
pread within the Ghanaian banking industry. This exacerbates
he moral hazard and adverse selection problem in the Ghanaian
redit market. This has made bank borrowing very costly, hence
ffecting borrower’s ability to repay bank loans. In line with
xpectations, bank income diversification which stabilizes the
ncome of banks was found to be negatively related to bank non-
erforming loans in all estimations. This implies that branching
nto non-interest generating activities reduces the overall risk
f default associated with financial intermediation, hence lower
evels of non-performing loans. However, the relationship was
nly significant in model 2 at 1%.
Consistent with previous studies,24 we find a negative sig-
ificant relationship between non-performing loans and gross
omestic product growth rate (GDP rate) in all estimations. This
ndicates that in a booming economy where economic activities
24 The Salas and Saurina (2002), Rajan and Dhal (2003), Fofack (2005) and
imenez and Saurina (2006).
t
e
(re brisk, bank borrowers are able to generate enough returns
hich enable them to service their loan commitments. This indi-
ates that the asset quality of banks is less likely to deteriorate
uring periods of high economic growth. In the words of Laeven
nd Majnoni (2003), ‘bankers on average create too little pro-
isions in good times’. This relationship is significant at 5% in
odels 1 and 4 and 1% in models 2 and 3. The coefficients
f GDP rate indicate that a percentage growth in economy will
mprove the asset quality (decrease in non-performing loans) of
anks by 1.006%, 1.201%, 0.800% and 0.665% in models 1, 2,
 and 4, respectively.
The positive relationship between non-performing loans and
nflation rate conforms to the findings of Fofack (2005)25 and
everal other studies26 but contrary to that of Shu (2002). This
mplies that rising inflation leads to deterioration in the quality
ank loan portfolio. Theoretically, increasing levels of infla-
ion erode the purchasing power of consumers, restricting theo generate enough returns to service the loans. Therefore in
25 For both CFA and non-CFA Sub-Saharan African countries. The sample
xcluded Ghana.
26 Baboucˇek and Jancˇar (2005), Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano (2006) and Klein
2013).
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eriods of high inflationary pressures, the asset quality of banks
s more likely to deteriorate. These relationships exhibit signif-
cance levels of 1% in all estimations. Real exchange rate was
lso found to have a positive relationship with non-performing
oans. This implies that a depreciation in the local currency
eads to the decline in the quality of banking industry loan
ssets. This result is consistent with that of Fofack (2005) and
lein (2013). With most of the banking industry credit allo-
ated for commerce and finance to fund export-oriented firms,
he depreciation of the currency limits the ability to earn enough
rofits to cover bank credit repayment terms. The increased
rices make it difficult to ensure high turnover for goods and
ervices.
.4.  Robustness  test
On examining the robustness of system GMM estimations,
n Table 4.4, the basic model (Eq. (1)) was re-estimated using
he ordinary least squares panel-corrected standard errors (OLS-
CSE)27 of Beck and Katz (1995) and the difference GMM
f Arellano and Bond (1991). The diagnostics of the OLS
ndicate the presence of heteroskedasticity but no serial correla-
ion. The results presented in Table 4.5 are generally consistent
ith the results in model 1. In OLS estimation, all the sig-
ificant variables in the systems GMM estimation maintained
heir significance with the exception of income diversification
INCDIV) and real exchange rate; however, in the difference
MM results, only income diversification was insignificant.
dditional robustness tests28 using different measures of com-
etition (HHI for deposits and assets) are consistent with these
stimations.
.  Conclusion  and  policy  implications
To enhance the stability of financial markets, studies have
ought to examine the factors that affect the quality of bank
oan portfolio mainly in developed economies. With little evi-
ence on such factors in bank dominated financial markets
n emerging economies, this study examined both bank level
nd macroeconomic determinants of bank asset quality in an
merging Ghanaian banking market with high levels of non-
erforming loans. This would provide regulatory authorities
nd bank management in Ghana and other emerging economies
ith the appropriate indicators to inform policy decisions in
mproving the performance of banking system loan portfolio.
 panel data model on 25 Ghanaian banks from 2005 to 2010
as estimated using the two-step system and difference GMM
stimation of Arellano and Bover (1995) as well as the ordi-
ary least squares panel-corrected standard errors of Beck and
atz (1995) to identify the determinants of non-performing
oans.
27 According to Beck and Katz (1995), the PCSE makes the OLS efficient when
he non-sphericity (i.e. serial correlation or heteroskedasticity) of the error terms
s accounted for.
28 Unreported but available on request.
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Descriptive statistics of the non-performing loans over the
tudy indicate that significant portions of banking industry
ssets are locked up in non-performing loans. From our empir-
cal estimations, we find evidence of a positive persistence
ffect of non-performing loans. This arises because of con-
inuous deterioration in the performance of the banks’ loan
ortfolio. Market concentration, bank size and income diver-
ification were found to have a positive impact on bank asset
uality, while bank interest spread and credit growth impact
egatively on performance of bank loan portfolio. The empiri-
al models outlined in this study also support the view that the
acroeconomic environment is an important factor in explain-
ng bank non-performing loans. Specifically, the results show
hat inflation rate and exchange rate depreciation negatively
mpacts bank asset quality. However, growth in the real econ-
my translates into improvements in the asset quality of banking
ndustry. The results show that the impact of growth in real
DP, real exchange rate and inflation on asset quality is instan-
aneous.
In this study, we provided first evidence of bank charac-
eristics that explains bank loan performance in an emerging
anking market in addition to the widely known macroeconomic
actors. The findings of the study have implications for the reg-
lation and management of banks in Ghana and other emerging
conomies. First, the identification of the bank specific deter-
inants of bank asset quality would provide the basis for some
orm of managerial supervision by regulatory authorities since
he management has control over such factors. Most importantly,
fforts at improving the competiveness of the banking industry
hould be backed by the development of an information depos-
tory to collate data for the monitoring of borrower repayment
ehaviour. Since monitoring borrower behaviour is found to be
asy and less costly in concentrated market, the strengthening of
he recently established credit bureau would address any infor-
ation imbalances which may arise in competitive markets. For
ank management, the factors identified in this study would help
nform policy decisions in improving credit appraisal mecha-
isms to improve the quality of bank loan portfolios. We also
dvocate for an effective risk management mechanism by banks
o detect early signs of borrower default.
This study identifies the following gaps for further stud-
es. To better understand the channels for the fluctuations in
on-performing, we propose that further studies should be
ndertaken to examine how different loan categories (i.e. loans
o household, private enterprises, public enterprises and govern-
ent institutions) affect bank asset quality. Due to the critical
ole of governance in bank management and the ownership stake
y governments in some major banks in Ghana, we advise further
tudies on the effect of ownership structure and other corpo-
ate governance indicators on the bank asset quality. Future
tudies could test for the existence of the non-linear relation-
hip between competition and non-performing as discovered by
artinez-Miera and Repullo (2010). This would enable regu-ators to identify the threshold effects of competition policy.
astly, this study could also be replicated in other emerging
anking markets to provide tools for ensuring the soundness of
nancial systems.
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